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ABSTRACT
In this report, there is a multi-faceted analysis of how the COVID-19 pandemic affected
relationships within U.S. mortgage markets. First, the paper looks at the economic conditions
that arose after the pandemic hit in March 2020. These conditions included a severe drop in
home sales followed by the Fed consistently decreasing the Fed Funds rate. Next, the paper looks
at the perspective of the individual homeowner and renter. This section touches on the lacking
access to liquidity that individuals had during the pandemic, thus making it hard for them to
make mortgage or rent payments. Then, there is an examination of the policy action taken to
combat these conditions. This specifically looks at the CARES Act and the forbearance program
that was attached to it. And to conclude, there is a look at the inequalities that arose within the
mortgage market during the pandemic. These include both race- and income-based inequalities
that limited people’s access to making their mortgage payments.
Keywords: Mortgage, COVID-19, Pandemic, CARES, Forbearance, MBS, Inequality,
JEL Classifications: D63, E42, G21, I18, R30, R31
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Introduction
There is no question that the COVID-19 pandemic has tested the stability of the global economy
for the past two years. Ranging from small, local markets to complex financial markets, the
COVID-19 virus has negatively affected all kinds of economic markets. However, specific
markets have faced a larger burden than others due to certain characteristics. The specific case
that will be examined in the following analysis is the United States mortgage market, in both its
primary and secondary forms. When COVID-19 began to spread in the United States in March of
2020, the principal concern for fiscal and monetary policymakers was the stark decline of
economic activity (Gordon et al. 2020). This concern made significant waves in the U.S.
mortgage markets and caused many to question how it would affect people’s ability to make
mortgage payments. To help introduce this phenomenon, there will be an examination of
mortgage delinquency projections from when the pandemic first hit the United States. This
projection-based examination will provide crucial context for the overall analysis of the
pandemic’s effects on the U.S. mortgage market.
In Grey Gordon and John Jones’s article entitled Loan-Delinquency Projections for COVID-19,
they apply a unique analysis to make their projections. They use two financial ratios, debt
service-to-income and loan-to-value, as thresholds to measure if a mortgage was defaulting
(Gordon et al. 2020). By comparing these ratios to mortgage delinquency rates in 2019, they
were able to produce their projections for 2020. Within their analysis, they constructed three
scenarios of loan-delinquency rates in a severe, intermediate, and favorable case (Gordon et al.
2020). This provided the authors with data that described all possible outcomes regarding loandelinquency rates. These three scenarios are shown graphically below in Figures 1-3.
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Figure 1: Baseline Scenario

Figure 2: Favorable Scenario

Figure 3: Severe Scenario

Figures 1-3 above show how varying policy implementations will affect the loan-delinquency
rates in the three different scenarios. In the presence of no policy, delinquency rates range from
“2.8% to 8.1% and write-offs total $420 billion to $1.1 trillion depending on the scenario”
(Gordon et al. 2020). However, when policy is implemented, the graphs show how significantly
the default-rates decline. In particular, the mortgage forbearance policy has the largest impact on
these rates. Specific policy implementation will be looked at in a more in-depth light later on in
this report. Regardless, obtaining this projection-based analysis on mortgage delinquency rates
will paint a much clearer picture of the mortgage market as a whole. With this understanding
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solidified, the paper will transition into the overall economic climate during the COVID-19
pandemic, with a specific focus on the mortgage markets.
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Understanding the economic climate during the pandemic
To understand how the U.S. mortgage markets have been affected by COVID-19, there must first
be an analysis of the conditions that the markets are facing. When the pandemic first struck in
2020, the housing market faced a steep drop in home sales due to lockdowns and general
uncertainty. However, as mortgage interest rates reached record lows, sales began to soar in both
new and existing homes (The State of the Nation’s Housing 2021, 2021). This is shown in Figure
4 below.
Figure 4: Year-over-Year Change in Single-Family Home Sales (Percent)

These low rates combined with a greater desire for private space due to the pandemic contributed
to extremely high demand in the housing market. The COVID-19 pandemic played a role on the
supply side of the market as well. When the virus initially spread in the U.S., many people
“pulled their homes off the market while others delayed listing their homes for sale” (The State
of the Nation’s Housing 2021, 2021). These tight conditions along with extreme demand helped
lead to record price increases in both new and existing homes. Now that the general housing
market has been examined, there can be a deeper dive into the U.S. treasury market’s conditions
during the pandemic.
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Once the threat of COVID-19 began to cause severe instability in the U.S. Treasury Market, it
was up to the Federal Reserve to take action. They cut the Federal funds rate by 50 basis points,
“to maintain the liquidity and functioning of credit markets” (Golding/Goodman 2020). Even
with the Fed taking action, the spreads between 10-year treasuries and agency mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) reached 170 basis points. This record-breaking mark demonstrated the severe
stress levels in both the primary and secondary mortgage markets. On March 23, 2020, this
pushed the Fed to take further action by expanding their agency MBS purchases without bounds.
The Fed said they would make these purchases “in the amounts needed to support smooth market
functioning and effective transmission of monetary policy to broader financial markets and the
economy” (Golding/Goodman 2020). This mindset within the Fed pushed the secondary
mortgage rate down to normal levels during the fall of 2020. But why did the primary mortgage
rate not follow suit?
While the primary mortgage rate did decrease throughout the summer and into the fall of 2020, it
did not decrease at the level of the secondary rate or the 10-year treasury rates. A large portion of
this can be attributed to the drop in mortgage servicing rights (MSRs) trading. This is because
the servicing of delinquent loans is a much greater cost to the servicer than the servicing of a
performing loan (Golding/Goodman 2020). Another issue that caused the primary mortgage rate
to decrease as a lower rate lay in the refinance market. Due to lower rates, there was a high
volume of refinance applications paired with slow processing speeds as many originators were
working from home (Golding/Goodman 2020). This combination of high demand and slowlyprocessing supply put a large amount of pressure on mortgage originators. This was a pivotal
feature in the explanation of the primary mortgage rate’s movement during the early months of
the pandemic.
To conclude this section, there will be an examination of the economic conditions going into the
COVID-19 Crisis. Some of these conditions will be compared to those present before the Global
Financial Crisis in 2007-08 to provide further context. Before the pandemic, households in the
U.S. had more financial security than they had leading up to the GFC (Amromin et al. 2020).
This was a result of the growth seen in the recovery from the GFC, which was displayed through
a sturdy labor market and a decline in household debts. Another condition that differed from the
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period before the GFC was the enhanced stability of the mortgage finance system. This stability
was made possible through government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) like Freddie Mac and
Fannie Mae, as they back about 67% of all mortgage debt in the United States (Amromin et al.
2020). While these positive conditions helped bolster the economy against the shock of the
pandemic, there were also negative aspects on the other side of the coin that demonstrated the illpreparedness of the U.S. economy.
Even with a few favorable economic conditions present before the COVID-19 pandemic hit, a
large number of people in the U.S. were still financially unprepared. An example of this was
shown in liquidity access, as “only 63% of households saying they would cover an unexpected
$400 expenditure with cash” (Amromin et al. 2020). This minimized liquidity was not the only
issue, as the strong mortgage finance system had an arising issue as well. Within this system,
there were sparsely-capitalized nonbank financial institutions that were playing the role of
mortgage servicers (Amromin et al. 2020). This demonstrated a presence of instability that could
play a significant role in the overall system. Overall, both the mortgage markets and the
economy as a whole were in unique positions as the pandemic had begun. With this established,
there can be a discussion of the individual homeowner during this time, and how they were able
to react to these conditions.
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Looking at the individual homeowner
Now there can be an examination of the individual, whether they were a current or prospective
homeowner at the time, and see how they reacted to the economic environment discussed above.
A Joint Center survey done in 2020 found looked at how renters financially reacted to COVIDrelated job losses. This survey found that about a quarter severely “depleted their savings,
another quarter had borrowed from family and friends, and a tenth had turned to payday or
personal loans” (The State of the Nation’s Housing 2021, 2021). Even though most of these
people survived the economic conditions brought upon by the pandemic, it is going to be that
much harder for people to reattain the financial level where they were originally. This is because
they will have fewer financial resources to rely on in the case of emergencies or other unusual
situations.
With the widespread suffering of job loss that arose during the pandemic, the government
stepped in to ensure increased financial stability for those that suffered. At the end of 2020 and
again in March 2021, the government provided $50 billion in total to help households that had
fallen behind on rent (The State of the Nation’s Housing 2021, 2021). This allowed people to get
back on their feet, spark growth in the economy, and produce over 1.3 million jobs by April
2021. Another support system lay in the presence of forbearance and a ban on foreclosure. This
allowed borrowers to delay or reduce their monthly mortgage payments for as long as 18 months
(The State of the Nation’s Housing 2021, 2021). These government-backed programs were
essential for the revitalization of both the mortgage market and the economy as a whole. They
will be discussed in further detail in a later section of this report.
Homeowners in the single-family sector were not the only ones burdened during the pandemic.
Renters in the multifamily sector also faced the serious blow of COVID-19. The pandemic
initiated a large number of unforeseen costs in the operations segment of multifamily housing.
These operations expenses included “additional cleaning time and equipment, personal
protective equipment for staff, and addressing greater wear and tear on the units from tenants
spending so much time at home” (The State of the Nation’s Housing 2021, 2021). With property
managers forced to cover expenses like these, they would have no choice but to raise their
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tenants’ monthly rents. This raising of rents put extreme pressure on tenants, who may have also
been going through lay-offs due to so many businesses shutting down. A survey done by the
National Apartment Association in September 2020 stated that 1/5 of property owners’ overall
expenses rose by 50%, while another fifth’s expenses rose by 25% or more (The State of the
Nation’s Housing 2021, 2021). This survey data is a clear indicator that property owners were
forced to raise rents to cover costs. This is a clear example of how multifamily tenants suffered
similarly to single-family homeowners at the hands of the pandemic.
In understanding this comparison between homeowners and renters, is there a way to see who
was affected by the pandemic more severely? Data from the Survey of Consumer Finances show
that before the pandemic in 2019, the median cash savings of homeowners was $10,100 whereas
it was only $1,400 for renters (The State of the Nation’s Housing 2021, 2021). This significant
gap shows while both groups were ill-prepared for the pandemic, renters had significantly fewer
resources going into 2020. There is more data to prove this gap as well. The Urban Institute
produced surveys at the turn of 2020 regarding renters using their savings to make payments.
These surveys found that between 25 to 40 percent of “renter households had used savings to
cover their housing payments during the pandemic” (The State of the Nation’s Housing 2021,
2021). This is another demonstration of renters being forced to hastily adapt to the poor
conditions they were facing.
To conclude the discussion of the individual, there will be an examination of a more positive
result that has come out of the COVID-19 pandemic. Due to the Fed’s magnanimous purchasing
of assets, mortgage rates reached some of the lowest levels they had seen in decades. This
allowed qualified borrowers to “reduce their monthly mortgage payments by refinancing into a
lower-rate loan” (Amromin et al. 2020). With the ability to refinance and lower payments, many
homeowners were able to continue to make mortgage payments even with the presence of
income disruptions. Interestingly enough, the larger presence of refinances helped mortgage
lenders as well. One would expect mortgage lenders and investors to suffer from lower rates due
to prepayment risk (Amromin et al. 2020). But, with lower mortgage payments for homeowners,
there is a reduction in the chance of mortgage delinquencies, which is beneficial for both parties.
This section has shown both the extreme difficulties as well as the surprising positives that
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individuals have faced during the pandemic. Now, this next section will look at policies and
programs established to help these individuals and the results they provided.
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Policies and regulations put in place to aid the individual homeowner
To begin this discussion of policies and regulations, there will be a look back at some of the
lessons learned from the policies enacted during the Global Financial Crisis in 2007. The first
lesson learned is that programs should be designed in a straightforward manner, thus allowing
for simple access and use. During the GFC, policymakers created “complex screening
mechanisms in an effort to target truly struggling borrowers” (Amromin et al. 2020). This made
it an even more difficult process for the borrowers, which ultimately slowed down the work done
by the financial institutions, thus decelerating the entire payment process. This explains that
straightforward policies benefit both sides of the coin, allowing for general economic recovery at
the individual and aggregate levels. The GFC also showed the important role that credit market
intermediaries in providing payment relief to mortgage borrowers (Amromin et al. 2020). These
intermediaries had complications with their constraints and incentives, which created
unnecessary confusion for borrowers. As a lesson for policy-making in the presence of COVID19, there must be a constant dialogue with the intermediaries to ensure a smooth and successful
movement of funds.
Next, there will be a summary of some of the primary policy responses used to ease economic
tension and keep people in isolation to prevent the spread of COVID-19. The first large policy
made was the CARES Act in March 2020. This legislation provided direct payments to a large
number of people and increased the benefit access for those facing unemployment (The State of
the Nation’s Housing 2021, 2021). This was the first of three major legislations that began to
maintain stability in the American economy. The second major legislation was the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, which was established in December 2020. The relief in this program
included similar features to the CARES Act, like $600 stimulus checks and $25 billion in rental
support (The State of the Nation’s Housing 2021, 2021). The final major legislation during the
pandemic took place through the American Rescue Plan in March 2021. This bill provided
similar aid as the previous two bills, through the presence of rental assistance and unemployment
benefits. Now that a summary of these legislations has been presented, they can be examined
with a more direct focus.
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The CARES Act was the first line of defense utilized by the U.S. government against the
COVID-19 pandemic. While the CARES Act ended up providing about $3 trillion in relief, it
also implemented changes that directly impacted the mortgage industry. The Act required
mortgage lenders to establish a forbearance program. When a loan is in forbearance, the lender
allows the borrower to pay a lower amount or pause payments, agreeing to make up the
payments at a later date (An et al., 2021). This implementation was essential given the rise in
unemployment across the U.S. The CARES Act did not only establish these forbearance
requirements but clarified them making it easier for individuals to understand. This included
eliminating the requirement that the loan is current and eliminating the full approval of
forbearance so long as the borrower could confirm a “COVID-19 related hardship”
(Golding/Goodman 2020). The clarification of these laws in the CARES Act made it easier for
both individuals and servicers in the mortgage industry. It allowed these parties to make more
responsible decisions and maintain accountability as well. For example, as demonstrated by
Section 4021, the CARES Act mandated “special reporting by credit bureaus for loans in
pandemic-related forbearance” (An et al., 2021). This is just another direct example of how the
CARES Act provided greater overall clarity through its forbearance program.
While forbearance was an essential program applied through the CARES Act, it was not a longterm solution to the economic issues caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Since forbearance only
delivered temporary relief to these issues, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) stepped
in regarding next steps. The FHFA, which regulates the GSEs, “adopted a ‘waterfall’ approach to
prioritize how its servicers should work out loans exiting forbearance (An et al., 2021). This
would require that the borrowers fully complete their missed payments, which would then
require some work from mortgage servicers. For example, servicers would have to set up shortterm repayment plans, modify the rates or terms of the loans, and possibly pursue foreclosure
alternatives (An et al., 2021). Although mortgage forbearance was an essential program for the
pandemic, it was not the long-term solution for total economic recovery. There must be a balance
of payments in the financial sector to maintain overall economic health. And this could only be
achieved if the loans in forbearance ended up being paid in full.
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Inequality resulting from the mortgage market during the COVID-19 Pandemic
The final section of this report looks at an unexpected result from the mortgage market during
the pandemic. However, it may be the most crucial issue that the nation has faced. Since
mortgages are connected to the largest percentage of household wealth, the activity in the
mortgage market is inevitably going to affect specific groups of people in a harsher manner (An
et al., 2021). Xudong An and his colleagues put this research to the test in a statistical analysis.
Using data from Black Knight’s Mortgage Servicing Platform (MSP), An and his team attempted
to recognize how people of different races and ethnicities were affected in making their mortgage
payments during the pandemic. The study found that Black and Hispanic borrowers respectively
had 9.8% and 6.4% higher rates of nonpayment than their white counterparts (An et al., 2021).
The study tracked data in a pre-pandemic period ranging from 2016 to 2019 and found little
disparity based on race. However, once the pandemic hit in 2020, these disparities expanded
rapidly causing more inequality for Black and Hispanic mortgage borrowers.
Along with racial disparities in the mortgage market, this study found key information regarding
income disparities as well. The data showed that borrowers with low credit scores were more
likely to have higher nonpayment rates and “to miss forbearance opportunities” (An et al., 2021).
There is a clear issue here, as individuals with lower credit scores are the ones who most
desperately need access to forbearance opportunities. This demonstrates an obvious flaw in the
policy system, that can only be fixed through a more comprehensive effort by government
entities. There needs to be more resources and time focused on optimizing access to these
government programs. This will allow those who truly need relief to obtain what they
specifically need. Regardless, An’s study does an exceptional job of displaying the inequities
based on race and income as a result of the mortgage market during the pandemic.
These inequities persisted through an unexpected factor as well: educational attainment. Whether
an individual obtained a bachelor’s degree or just a high school diploma had a significant impact
during the pandemic. In households that lost income due to pandemic-related factors, 74% of
them were led by someone without a college degree (The State of the Nation’s Housing 2021,
2021). This is a clear-cut example of inequality being exacerbated through the presence of
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COVID-19. However, this is not the only case of educational inequality taking place during the
pandemic. The Bureau of Labor Statistics found that a much larger portion of workers with a
bachelor’s degree worked in jobs that could be performed from home in comparison to workers
with a high school diploma (The State of the Nation’s Housing 2021, 2021). The ratio of workers
was nearly three to one in this statistic, with 67.5% of workers with a degree to 24.5% of
workers with a diploma. With COVID-19 spreading at higher rates and the government
enforcing more lockdowns, this made it much more difficult for those with only a high school
diploma to perform their occupations and therefore earn income. This allowed for an even
greater income gap, as those with jobs that require a bachelor’s degree were still able to perform
their tasks from home
.
To conclude this section, there will be an examination of the inequalities seen in the connection
between race and income. According to the 2021 State of the Nation’s Housing Report, 67% of
Hispanic, 58% of Black, and 53% of Asian homeowners reported that they lost income after the
pandemic started in March 2020 (The State of the Nation’s Housing 2021, 2021). These statistics
compared to only 49% of white homeowners reporting income losses. The worst part about these
statistics is that the racial disparities only increase within lower income brackets. This is
demonstrated graphically in Figure 5 below.
Figure 5: Share of Low-Income Households Behind on Payments (Percent)
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Figure 5 shows how much lower the percentage of white homeowners and renters that failed to
make their housing payments was in comparison to other races. Although inequalities in the
mortgage sector were present before the pandemic hit, the pandemic began to open the public’s
eyes to these inequalities through their intensification. This ultimately proves that there are
systemic issues that must be targeted by local and state government entities. The longer they wait
to take action, the more extreme these disparities will spread across different races and income
brackets.
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Conclusion
This report has provided an all-encompassing view of how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected
the entirety of the mortgage market. This perspective began with the economic conditions that
were present once the pandemic hit. This included drastic mortgage and treasury rate
fluctuations, which ultimately stimulated significant demand in the U.S. housing market. These
economic conditions also presented the lack of liquidity that households had access to for
emergency funds. This financial ill-preparedness established an incredibly difficult time for a
large number of homeowners. This transitioned the report’s viewpoint into the lenses of the
individual homeowner during the pandemic. This section explained how both homeowners and
renters had severe struggles making payments due to income shortages from the pandemic. Both
groups were unprepared, but the research showed that renters had much fewer savings funds
available on average, thus making it harder for them to cover unexpected expenses. However,
with a majority of negative results arising for individuals, there were a few positive ones.
Prospective homebuyers and current homeowners reaped the benefits of lower mortgage rates as
a result of the market. This allowed for lower payments which allowed them to allocate those
original funds towards other expenses.
The report then transitioned into the policies and regulations enacted to provide relief to
individual homeowners and renters. The U.S. government learned from the GFC that access to
relief is just as important as the relief itself. If people struggle to access relief due to certain
complexities, then it will not reach the people that need it most. This is why the CARES Act and
its following legislations were so effective in providing aid to households. They not only
provided direct payments and a forbearance program to people, but they delivered it in an
incredibly efficient manner. This form of aid allowed renters and homeowners to allocate funds
where they were needed most, which allowed them to get back on their feet financially. While
these relief programs were essential for homeowners, there were still results of the pandemic that
were unfavorable. This leads into the final body section of the report, which discussed the
inequality that took place in the mortgage market during the pandemic. This section highlighted
some of the critical inequalities that arose, including those based upon race and income. For
example, Black and Hispanic individuals had much higher nonpayment rates than their white
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counterparts. Also, data showed that individuals with lower credit scores were more likely to
miss forbearance opportunities. This demonstrates a complete defeating of a forbearance
program’s purpose. These were just a few pivotal examples of the numerous inequalities that
arose in the mortgage market during the pandemic.
Given this complete perspective of the mortgage markets in a pandemic environment, a key
question must be asked: What does one do with this analysis? With this information, there can be
insight into how to better prepare for a similar event in the future. From both an individual and
aggregate perspective, there can be measures taken to prevent many of the negative impacts of a
pandemic environment. This would include well-expedited forbearance programs, proper
maintenance of U.S. Treasury rates, and an emphasis on reducing multi-faceted inequality in the
presence of a pandemic. With a focus on these aspects, those within the mortgage market will
have a better chance of operating with minimized risk, even when facing unexpected economic
environments.
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